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DAVID G. LEMARQUAND*

Preconditions to Cooperation in
Canada-United States
Boundary Waters
INTRODUCTION
A glance at a map reveals how closely Canada and the United States
are joined by fresh water. East of Manitoba and Minnesota. from the
Rainy River to the Atlantic Ocean, lakes and rivers mark a 2.000 mile
discontinuous water frontier. Along the total 4,800 mile length of the
boundary nearly 300 lakes, rivers, and streams flow along or cross the
border. Contention over these waters has been a fact of bilateral relations
dating from the last century and will certainly remain significant in the
future.
Water is a transient resource that has value in itself, such as for domestic
use and irrigation, or as a conveyance of domestic and industrial wastes,
a source for hydroelectric generation. a channel for navigation, and a
habitat for fish and wildlife. Everyone who uses or shares access to the
resource has a stake in it. National, state, and provincial governments
can assure the rights to its use and protect its quality, though imperfectly,
through legal and institutional arrangements. Where the water forms a
boundary or flows across the border, no overriding authority oversees the
rights and obligations of water users. Arrangementg must be worked out
between the two sovereign governments acting to protect their national
interest as they perceive it. Broadly speaking, we can assume that this
interest entails appropriating as much of the value of the resource as
possible without jeopardizing relations with the neighbor.
The title of this article suggests there are preconditions to cooperation.
There is really only one precondition, the "political will" of the two
countries' governments to work together to seek solutions. In some issues
the political will to take joint action seems easy to achieve. In others,
like acid rain or pollution from toxic chemical disposal sites along the
Niagara frontier, the will seems lacking. Political will can be elusive.
but it is not entirely mysterious. An overriding concern of nation states
is sovereignty and territorial integrity. Cooperation imposes obligations
and responsibilities on states that limit their freedom to do as they like,
or it imposes costs that they may be reluctant to bear. To overcome this
limitation on sovereignty and the political, as well as economic. costs
*Environment Canada. senior advisor in intergovernmental affairs. The author conducted the
research for this article as a private consultant to the Federal Inquiry on Federal Water Policy. The
views expressed are his own and are not those of Environment Canada.
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entailed, there must be some compensating advantage to the state. The
advantage may be economic or political.
The essential, though not necessarily sufficient, precondition of political will is thus some conception of reciprocal benefit. Canada and the
United States have similar attitudes about environmental values, resource
use, and international responsibilities. Their interests are generally complementary in the pursuit of objectives such as a clean environment, public
health, and economic growth. In broad terms, the two governments and
the neighboring states and provinces are happy to work together through
scientific and technical exchanges, or to develop a policy to promote
common objectives. However, boundary water issues are geographically
specific and affect, for better or worse, real people who are more concerned about their own well-being, or public welfare as they perceive it,
than in harmonious bilateral relations. As both countries are democratic,
the political leaders give priority to these people and the interest groups
representing them. This article explores some of the underlying features
of Canada-United States boundary relations that lead to bilateral differences and affect the will to work cooperatively.
GEOPOLITICAL CONDITIONS
Central to any transboundary water dispute is the geopolitical configuration of spillovers and interests affected in one way or another by the
activity at the root of the problem. The location of the boundary line in
relation to the distribution of people, enterprises, and interest groups
benefiting from the activity and those damaged by it sets the stage for
cooperation or confrontation. In the extreme case controversies arise from
projects or activities that have external effects-pollution, changes in
water flow or levels, etc.-spilling over or threatening to spill over across
the boundary. One country benefits from the project at no environmental
cost, while the other suffers. From the proposed expansion of the Garrison
Diversion Project in North Dakota, Canada fears transfer of foreign biota
and disease through irrigation drainage from the Missouri basin to the
Souris and Red Rivers in the Hudson Bay drainage basin.' The United
States fears that open pit coal developments in the upper Flathead basin
in British Columbia may degrade water quality across the border in Montana, where the river has been designated a "wild and scenic river."2
One-way spillover issues are difficult to resolve. Proponents of projects
1.For a discussion of the Garrison project see 1. CAPRoL.. ENVIOMENTAL DIPLOMACY: AN
EXAMINATION AND A Nosp~cnv oF CANADIAN-U.S. TW,4SBOUNDARY RELATIONS 175-82 (1983).
2. See id. at 163-68 for a discussion of the Flathead River and the Cabin Creek Coal projects.
The river was declared a wild and scenic river under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C.
1274. §3(a)13 (1982).
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like the Cabin Creek coal development in the Flathead basin, the Poplar
Creek thermal power plant in Saskatchewan, or the Garrison project can
weigh the project's environmental damages against its benefits and decide
whether, on balance, it seems a good idea. People on the other side of
the boundary will only see the damage and no compensating benefit.
Protests against such projects can become unrestrained since the political
energy is directed across the border and is not challenged by domestic
proponents. Protest becomes even more strident when nationalistic sentiment adds to the sense of injury. Despite the heat of the protests, they
may have little effect. If the projects satisfy domestic legislative requirements, the governments will find baseless the charges that the projects
violate existing international prohibitions against damage or pollution.
Treaties, agreements, other aspects of relations, and the long border
mitigate one-way spillover issues. About fifty-five percent of the ninety
significant transboundary rivers flow from Canada to the United States?

In one case the United States may be upstream, in another downstream.
Realization of this reciprocal vulnerability led Secretary of State Elihu
Root in the early part of the century to accept a boundary waters treaty
with Canada based on the principle of equality.' This tack differed from
the one taken with Mexico in the same period when the United States
advanced the Harmon Doctrine to enshrine its upstream advantage on the
Rio Grande and Colorado.' In recent one-way spillover issues, the Canadian government accepted in late 1984 the United States proposal for
an International Joint Commission (UC) investigation of the Flathead
River coal development in British Columbia. In 1977 the United States
responded to Canadian protests that the Garrison project might violate
the anti-pollution provisions of the Boundary Water Treaty by agreeing

to an UC investigation of the Garrison diversion."
As in the Garrison case, generally spillovers adversely affect some

national groups in the originating country and this permits coalitions of
interests to form in opposition. The. National Audubon Society has led
the domestic American opposition to that project. A coalition of environmental groups formed in Washington state and British Columbia to
fight plans of the Seattle electrical utility, Seattle City Light, to raise the
Ross Dam in Skagit Valley and expand the reservoir into a valued wilderness valley in Washington and prime recreation land in British Co3. Bruce & Quinn. What Dfference Do Boundaries Make?. 4 CAN. WATER REs. J. 5 (1979).
4. See the Secretary of State's appraisal quoted in MEmoRANDUM OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
LEGAL ASPECTS OF USE OF INTERNATIONAL RivERs. S. Doc. No. 118. 85th Cong.. 2d Sess. 7 (1958).
5. See 21 OPeIIONS OF ATTORNEYS GENEA.L 274. 283 (1895). and I MOORE. DIGEST OF INTERNA.ioNdA. LAw 654 (1906).
6. INTERNATONAL J INT CoMMISsIoN. TRANSBOUNDARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE GARRISON DIvERSION
UNrr (Ottawa & Washington. UC. 1977).
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lumbia.7 For many issues along the border environmental and other likeminded groups form transnational coalitions.
In recent years the Canadian government has cultivated allies in the
United States through the diplomatically unorthodox means of public
diplomacy and the lobbying of elected officials. In the Garrison case the
government informally supported American interests opposed to the project. such as the National Audubon Society. In addition, officials from
both the federal government and Manitoba lobbied in Congress directly.
Strong domestic opposition to Garrison no doubt made the State Department more responsive to considering the Canadian argument that the
project would violate the anti-pollution provision of the Boundary Waters
Treaty and should be the subject of an UC investigation.
Similarly. the Canadian government has found friends it has wished to
encourage in issues like Niagara River toxic dump sites and acid rain.
With regard to acid rain, given the initial reluctance of the Reagan administration to discuss the issue, the Canadian government went beyond
cdngressional lobbying to public diplomacy. Through films, information
packages. speeches, interviews, and encouragement of journalistic interest in the issue, Environment Canada and the Canadian Embassy in
Washington worked to develop and encourage a constituency in the United
States willing to pressure their elected representatives to action.
In a variant geopolitical configuration governments may work to optimize benefits from pogitive spillovers. A regulation dam upstream can
have benefits downstream for power production and flood control. By
integrating river basin development two countries can enjoy greater economic returns than if each worked independently of the other. The Columbia River dams upstream in Canada and the St. Lawrence Seaway
and Power Project were negotiated on that basis. In the last two decades
such developments have faded from view for lack of compelling projects
and a less sympathetic political atmosphere. Vestiges linger on in some
quarters in the appeal of visionary continental scale water transfer schemes,
such as the Grand Canal scheme which envisages damming James Bay
and pumping water south through the Great Lakes to the United States.'
Another kind of geopolitical issue concerns boundary water levels.
Where dams and other works control water levels and flows, the UC,
except where special bilateral arrangements have been established such
as for Lake of the Woods and Lake Memphremagog, sets a regulation
regime that attempts to balance riparian interests. As the waters are shared,
7. See D. LEMARQUAND. INTERNATIONAL RIvERs: THE POIMCS OF COOPERATnON 79-93 (1977).
8. See Kierans. The Grand Recvcling and Northern Development (GRAND) Canal. in PROCEEDING:
OrrARIo WATER RESOURCES CONFERENCE 24 (Sponsored by the Ontario government to examine
future demands, availability, and best uses of Ontario's water -resources. June 12 to 14. 1984.

Toronto: available from the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources. Toronto).
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conflicts may be more between different types of water users than between
governments. Regulation of the Great Lakes has long been controversial.
The vast amount of natural storage makes lake levels remarkably stable.
Nevertheless, levels do fluctuate and, for example, during the extreme
high levels experienced in 1985 and 1986 lakeshore interests demanded
reductions beyond what existing controls at the outlets of Lake Superior
and Lake Ontario can accomplish. There is, however, no consensus on
an acceptable levels regime. Hydro, shipping, and lakeshore interests,
as well as environmentalists, have different views. Moreover, in UfC
regulation studies, the commission found it impractical and uneconomic
to develop new regulation works beyond what nature and the existing
controls provide. 9
Some of the most difficult water quality problems along the boundary
arise from patterns of industrialization, urbanization, and land use. In the
past, rivers like the Saint John suffered from common abuse. Where the
river or lake is equally valued by both countries, both have incentives to
reverse the process of degradation. This does not necessarily mean the
swift introductiion of remedial measures. Implementation may be delayed
as a result of the involved process of agreement and coordination from
among the various levels of government, and from the resistance of those
interest groups that benefit from existing practices. The most serious
problems affecting the Great Lakes are of this reciprocal nature. Eutrophication, which is degradation of water quality from excessive discharges
of nutrients such as phosphorous. toxic pollution, long range transport
of air pollution, and consumptive uses of water are the most serious
problems facing the two countries. Canada and the United States share
the Great Lakes, and each suffers the consequences of pollution. The
contribution to Great Lakes problems is not equal and the disproportionate
use and abuse of the lakes gives these problems some of the characteristics
of one-way spillover issues. Canadian initiatives to deal with the Great
Lakes problems run into the indifference of the American political process
to Canadian concerns and objections. This is a major feature of bilateral
boundary relations.
UNITED STATES DOMINANCE
The United States, by the weight of its population. the use it makes
of shared water resources, and the thrust of its domestic policy, dominates
the boundary water relations. While the United States dominates relations,
its political interests are centered elsewhere. Americans outnumber Canadians three to one in boundary basins: overall, they outnumber Ca9. INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION. FURTHER REGULATION OF THE GREAT LAKES (Ottawa &
Washington. UJC. 1976).
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nadians ten to one.'" The relative population sparseness, in American
terms, of their boundary region gives Canadians a different perspective
from Americans of the same boundary regions and water resources.
The Flathead case illustrates the point. The British Columbia government sees the upper basin as ripe for coal development. In Montana the
United States government classified the river as a "scenic and wild river,""
a designation Americans would like Canada to apply to prevent coal
developments. A similar problem may eventually arise in the StikineIskut area of the Alaska Panhandle, designated a wilderness area on the
American side, and planned as an area of hydroelectric development
upstream by British Columbia Hydro. There are a number of existing and
planned energy, mining, and logging developments in Canada close to
the border, particularly in the West. Many of the projects were shelved
during the recession of the early 1980s in Canada, and the complaints
heard in the late 1970s from American officials that the United States
was downstream in all too many instances have subsided. Nevertheless,
the difference remains. Americans tend to prize the boundary wilderness
area as the last remaining accessible frontier, while Canadians see the
boundary region as a corridor for development. The true wilderness areas
worthy of preservation are further north.' 2
Some of the most complex and serious problems occur within the Great
Lakes basin. The basin supports a population of about 40 million, of
which about 7.5 million live in Ontario. This is approximately a third of
the total Canadian population. The American Great Lakes population
accounts for one-seventh of the total population in the United States. The
basin is the center of heavy industry in North America. It generates about
one-third of Canada's national income, and about one-sixth of American
national income. 3
Naturally, the United States, with its larger population and industrial
base, has historically made and continues to make greater use of the water
resources. It accounts for eighty-seven percent of the approximately 4,900
cfs (140 cms) of water consumed from the lakes (1975 estimate) 4 and
discharges eighty percent of conventional pollutants from treatment plants.'5
One can assume a similar proportion for toxics and non-point sources of
10. Bruce & Quinn, supra note 3. at 9.
I 1. See Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, supra note 2.
12. Bruce & Quinn, supra note 3,at 9.

13. INTERNATIONAL GREAT LAKES DIVERSION AND CONSUMPTIVE USES STUDY BOARD. REPORT TO
THE INTERNATIONAL JoiNT CoMMssIoN 2-30 (1981) (Available from UC Ottawa and Washington)
[hereinafter cited as REPORT TO THE DC].
14. Id. at 6-50. Consumptive uses are also reported in International Joint Commission. GREAT
LAEs DvtsoNs AND CONSUMTIVE USES 27-30 (Ottawa and Washington. 11C. 1985).
15. Municipal Abatement Task Force of the Water Quality Committee. REPORT TO THE GREAT
LAm WATER QuALrry BoARD 6 (1983) (Available from the LC. Ottawa and Washington).
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population. This presents Canadians with a dilemma. As Munton points
out, for the United States it is a modest advantage to have Canadian
cooperation in clean-up efforts; for Canada it is a necessity to have Amer6
ican cooperation. ,
Although the American population in the Great Lakes basin is about
five times larger than the neighboring Canadian basin population. the
American Great Lakes population has less political power in Washington
than its Canadian counterpart has in Ottawa. Great Lakes issues do not
have the same national political priority that such issues have in Canada.
The locus of American political and economic power has been shifting
to the South and West, and the Great Lakes region has declined in economic and political power. As a consequence, relevant national programs,
such as for waste water treatment and sewage, favor the new power
centers more than the older communities with their aging industrial and
urban base. Moreover, the interest in the region in Great Lakes issues
has been unfocused. The eight Great Lakes states and their congressional
representatives have not developed in the past a community of interest
centering on Great Lakes issues, though this is changing.
In the last few years the regional voice in environmental and economic
development matters is starting to be heard more strongly in Congress
and in executive departments. New.political organizations, like the Council of Great Lakes Governors and Northeast-Midwest and Senate and
congressional coalitions, have been formed with a mandate to consider
Great Lakes issues and represent regional interests. In the development
of this regional voice the states' and Great Lakes political interests are
reaching across the lakes *and the St. Lawrence to considei with Ontario
and Quebec such issues as the diversion of waters from the Great Lakes
and acid rain., 7
The fact remains that Canada is dependent on American domestic
politics to solve issues of reciprocal damage. Where American groups
allied to Canadian interests lack political force in Washington. as they
do for issues like acid rain, the Canadian government can do little. Congressmen, and the President, see few votes in approving measures designed mostly to protect Canadians from the spillover of American practices,
especially when those practices are of benefit to their constituents. The
American government responds more readily to Canadian diplomatic in16. Muanton. CanadianLaws and Institutions. in DEctsIoN FOR THE GR.AT LAKEs 144 (D.Misener
& G.Daniel ed. 1982).
17. See Note on the Signing of the Great Lakes Charter by Ten Great Lakes State Governors and
Premiers in Feb. 1985. 15 ENVT REP. 1813 (1985) (Available from Council of Great Lakes Governors. 122 W. Washington Ave.. Suite 801A. Madison. Wis. 53703) [hereinafter cited as Note on
the Signing of the Great Lakes Charter].
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itiatives and arguments if there are balancing domestic interests or the
Canadian opponents have little political weight.
A case can be made that for major issues, like Great Lakes cleanup or
acid rain. international agreements will only be as progressive as domestic
American policy. In other words, the progress in Great Lakes cleanup
results from American programs applicable nationwide. From this perspective the 1972 and 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements offer
nothing more than what would have been achieved otherwise by application of the Clean Water Act. " This view finds support more among
American observers and officials than among Canadian.
Paradoxically, the inwardness of American policy formulation, with its
relative insensitivity to Canadian concerns, combined with the dominant
position along the boundary. can make for expansionist transboundary
policies. This arises from the different approach to environmental issues
adopted in the United States.
MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHIES
The two countries see water resources and boundary waters differently.
Americans tend to look at boundary water resource issues from the point
of view of equity and equitable utilization, in which the rights and obligations of the individual water user are recognized. Canadians see boundary
water issues in terms of equality, and the rights and responsibilities of
the two states. The American approach aims to secure the advantages of
the larger population, the Canadian the advantages of geography and the
rigid application of the notion of territorial integrity. Canada starts from
a position supporting equality. In negotiating the Boundary Waters Treaty
of 1909 the Canadian side sought acceptance of the principal of equality.
At that time Canadians feared United States power and wanted to deal
with the United States on an equal footing in the settlement of boundary
water disputes. '"The Boundary Waters Treaty accepts that principle and
guarantees equal and similar rights in the use of boundary waters, -0 for
example. in rivers forming the boundary on the basin the flow is divided
18. Agreement with Canada on Great Lakes Water Quality. April 15. 1972. United States-Canada.
23 U.S.T. 301. T.1.A.S. No. 7512. superseded by Agreement Between the United States and Canada
on Great Lakes Water Quality. 1978. in 31 INT'L ENvTL. REP.601 (published by the Bureau of
National Affairs. Inc.).
19. For a review of correspondence that brings out Canadian fears of dealing with the United
States through special commissions on a case by case basis without agreed upon general principles
to restrain American power. see Gibbons. Sir George Gibbons and the Boundary Waters Treaty of

1909. 34 CAN. HIST. REv. 124 (19531: see also Neary. Grey. B.ce. and the Settlement of Canadian
American Differences. 49 CANd.
HisT. REv. 367 (1968).

20. Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters. Jan. I1.
1909, United States-Canada. 36 Stat. 2448. T.S. No 548 [hereinafter cited as Boundary Waters
Treaty].
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equally for the purposes of power production. The Canadian government
has tried to have the principle applied more generally to water quality,
arguing that each country should have a right to an equal share of the
assimilative capacity of common water bodies like the Great Lakes. On
the basis of territorial integrity each side should be able to do as it likes
on its side of the boundary, subject only to the provision that it maintain
agreed-upon quality standards at the boundary."
The disproportionate use the United States makes of boundary waters
would make the Canadian position difficult to implement in practice, even
if accepted by the American government. The United States acknowledges
the equality principle as set out in the Boundary Waters Treaty for uses
such as hydro power, but it does not accept the Canadian argument that
Canada should be compensated for greater American withdrawals, or
consumption, of water from boundary waters. UC projections foresee the
United States being responsible for eighty-two percent of the water consumption in the Great Lakes.2- Americans gain an economic benefit from
the consumption, but do not share the cost proportionately. While the
United States is responsible for eighty-two percent of the decrease in
flow, it shares with Canada, in proportion to present flow apportionment
provisions, the decline in hydroelectric generation at Niagara and on the
St. Lawrence. The greater American consumption represents. in effect,
a diversion out of the lakes for which Canada gains no compensation.
The American argument is that Canada has similar rights to the use of
boundary waters. It may not be exercising those rights to the same degree
as the United States, but that can be of no concern to the United States.
The United States follows a different approach than Canada for managing domestic water quality. Under the Clean Air Act, point source
standards are imposed on all dischargers regardless of the location or
condition of the receiving waters. The approach stresses equity. Waste
dischargers in bne part of the country face measures similar to those in
another. The emphasis is on process in the belief that if the process works
properly, environmental objectives will be achieved. The American government wanted Canada, in negotiation of the 1978 Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement, to adopt this approach and the standards under the
Clean Water Act. 23 The equity approach applied to boundary water issues
favors "equal responsibilities," equal commitments, and uniform regulatory policies, and disregards the quality of the water at the boundary.
21. See Munton. Great Lakes Water Quality: A Study in Environmental Politicsand Diplomacy.
in RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT: POUCY PERSPECTIVE FOR CANADA 175 (0. Dwivedi ed. 1980.
for a discussion of the principles used in negotiating the 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement.
22. See REPORT TO THE UC.supra note 13.
23. See Munton. supra note 21.
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In domestic environmental management Canadian governments tend
to work from the objectives, back to the source of the problem. Standards
and guidelines may be adopted, but they do not have the force of law.
Discharge licenses are negotiated taking into account the standards and
guidelines. The terms and conditions of the license are legally enforceable.
As the process is informal, and does not rely on the courts for enforcement
in the same way as in the United States, it is not always clear that
appropriate measures are being undertaken.
In international negotiations on Great Lakes water quality, American
negotiators often are skeptical that Canadian industrial waste dischargers
are making the necessary effort to meet agreed-upon objectives. (With
regard to municipal sewage treatment Ontario has been many years ahead
of neighboring states.) The Americans would prefer their approach, that
stresses "equal responsibility" and is open to legal challenge. The approach also ensures that one region does not gain a competitive advantage
from lax environmental regulation. Canadians, on the other hand. tend
to see the pursuit of American legislative provisions in international negotiations as an extraterritorial extension of U.S. legislation or, as Munton
quotes one official, "a fine example of imperialistic thinking." 24
FEDERALISM
The Canadian federal structure hinders the ability of the Canadian
federal government to respond effectively to some bilateral issues. The
American system gives its federal government a leading role in environmental issues, while in Canada the provinces own the natural resources,
and are protective of their authority and jurisdiction over water resources.
In the early 1970s the Canadian federal government adopted a fairly
aggressive stance to define a national interest in water issues. For water
quality, the government elaborated national effluent quality regulations
under the Fisheries Act of 1970 for industries, stich as pulp and paper,
and it began to deal directly with various industrial concerns. The provinces saw this and other legislative initiatives, such as the water quality
provisions of the Canada Water Act of 1970, as federal intrusion and
usurpation of provincial responsibilities, and an undesirable duplication
of effort.' As a consequence, the Department of the Environment backed
off and concentrated on indirect means to manage water quality, such as
research, surveillance, pollution control technology, technology transfer,
and advocacy of environmental protection measures.
The lack of direct hands-on authority to tackle water quality problems
hinders the government in its bilateral dealings. The Department of the
24. Id.
25. Fisheries Act R.S.C. 1970. F-14. § 32. Canada Water Act 1970. IstSupp. C5. See also J.
Mactavish. The Federal Role in Water Management 29 (Research paper No. 15 for the Inquiry on

Federal Water Policy: available from the Enquiry Centre. Environment Canada, Ottawa KIA OH3).
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Environment's Ontario regional office expressed the frustration of the
government in negotiating the Great Lakes issues:
Lacking a federal framework of legally enforceable standards comparable to that which exists in the United States, the federal government and departments dealing with water issues cannot directly
implement programs to meet signed treaty and agreement objectives
and obligations undertaken with the United States regarding Great
Lakes water quality
there exists no current mechanism where
DOE can coordinate federal and provincial water management activities of the region.'
The government must negotiate with the United States to secure transboundary agreement and, equally difficult, must negotiate a corresponding
federal-provincial agreement. Indeed, examination of federal-provincial
agreements could provide an interesting casebook of examples relevant
to the study of international boundary water relations.
The constrained power of the federal government best equips it to adopt
critical rather than positive positions with regard to transboundary problems. It can freely criticize actions and activities that threaten Canadian
interests. But it is less well equipped to initiate positive bilateral policies
requiring domestic legislation or programs in both countries, unless it
has the full cooperation of the relevant provinces. Similarly it has difficulties responding to initiatives from the American government. The
position of the. federal government is particularly awkward when the
-provincial government is the source of a problem. A provincial govern-.
ment may not recognize that its actions undermine a position the government is trying to establish overall or with regard to issues in another
part of the boundary.
The division of powers within the U.S. government can lead to similar
frustrations. The difficulty of gaining Senate approval for a treaty tends

to exclude treaties as an option. Thus the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreements are in law little more than expressions of good intentions;
they have no force. There is in fact a very skimpy formal treaty structure
for boundary relations. The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 provides
the framework; three other treaties are in force concerning water use: The
Lake of the Woods Treaty of 1925, " the Niagara River Treaty of 1950,28
and the Columbia River Treaty of 1961.
26. Environment Canada (Ontario Region). Submission to the Inquiry on Federal Water Policy
10 (1984-Submission No. 47. Oct. 30. 1984) (Available from Environment Canada Library. Ottawa
KIA OH3).

27. Convention to Regulate the Level of the Lake of the Woods. Feb. 24. 1925. United StatesCanada. 44 Stat. 2108. T.S. No. 721.
28. Treaty relating to Uses of Waters of the Niagara River. Feb. 27. 1950. United States-Canada,
I U.S.T. 694. T.I.A.S. No. 2130.
29. Treaty Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water Resources of the Columbia River
Basin. Ja. 17. 1961. United States-Canada. 15 U.S.T. 1555. T.I.A.S. No. 5638.
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INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
Overlying the structural features of Canada-United States relations are
the institutional arrangements between the two countries through which
their governments handle boundary water issues. These include treaties,
agreements, institutions, and arrangements for interchanges among officials and politicians. These latter arrangements are characterized by their
informality. The community of officials and politicians involved in bilateral matters is not large. They meet and renew contacts at scientific
conferences, UC board meetings, or during bilateral discussions. In times
of rather sour relations, such as those which have characterized the Trudeau-Reagan years of this decade, officials may engage in more amicable
relations than do their governments. Exchanges among low level officials
provide valuable supplements to information exchanged through normal
channels. Such informal intelligence gathering helps to provide an early
warning of impending issues, and permits actions before issues become
too politicized.
The division of powers of the American government allows"openings
for unorthodox diplomacy, such as the lobbying of elected officials and
public diplomacy. If the executive has little inclination to follow up on
issues like acid rain that the Canadian government considers vital. Canadian officials may be able to cultivate some support from sympathetic
interests on Capitol Hill and lobby groups. The executive-legislative divisions in the Canadian system and Canadian sensibilities to political
interference from below the border rather restrict corresponding American
initiatives in Canada. On the other hand, the United States government

does not need to go to any trouble for its views to be heard in Canada."°
A great many Canadians watch American television and read American
magazines. And the Canadian media is quick to report American positions
that have a bearing on Canada.
The Boundary Waters Treaty
Of note in recent years has been the growth of provincial-state arrangements. Most visible perhaps are meetings of the Great Lakes governors and premiers. In February 1985 they concluded a Charter for the
Great Lakes aimed at controlling diversions out of the Great Lakes.'
Other provincial-state meetings have been arranged to deal with the issue
of acid rain, such as one held in Quebec City in April 1985 bringing
together fifteen states and several provinces.
30. See Note on the Signing of the Great Lakes Charter. supra note 17.
31. The Canadian Embassy in Washington has a special environmental affairs section that maintains a network of contacts in Congress and among lobby groups. The U.S. Embassy in Ottawa has
no similar group.
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The most prominent institutional features of U.S.-Canadian relations
are the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 and the International Joint Commission. 2 The treaty provides a framework for guiding boundary water
policy. It was one of the first treaties Canada negotiated. It reflects the
federal government's concerns and uncertainties in its relations with the
United States, the boundary water issues of the time, and the American
government's preoccupation with territorial sovereignty. The treaty does
not address some of today's concerns, but the two governments evince
little interest in changing it. It has proven adaptable to changing conditions
along the boundary. Its strength is in the basic principles that guide the
two national governments in boundary water issues and the institution it
created, the International Joint Commission.
The principles of note in the treaty are first, each country has exclusive
jurisdiction over the use or diversion of transboundary rivers or rivers
flowing into boundary waters; if such use or diversion causes injury
downstream, the courts of the upstream country are open to inhabitants
from the downstream country." Second, both countries have equal and
similar rights in the use of boundary waters. More broadly, the treaty
establishes the principle of equality in the work of the UC and its delib.
erations in approving works on boundary water courses or downstream
on transboundary rivers that affect boundary water levels.' Third, boundary and transboundary waters shall not be polluted on either side to the
injury of health or property in the other country.35
For Canadian negotiators the most troubling part of the treaty was
article H, the provision enshrining "territorial sovereignty." In practice,
neither government has attempted to exercise this right. Ironically, debate
on the issue was most heated in the 1950s during the Columbia River
negotiations when Canada, as upstream riparian on the Kootenay and
Columbia Rivers, contemplated unilateral diversion. Today, as Bourne
says. the right "is still alive to some extent in Canada, surviving but
largely ignored when the time for making decisions is at hand."'
The treaty achieved one of the main Canadian objectives. It put Canada
on an equal footing with the United States. Article VIII makes the point
that each side has "equal and similar rights" in the use of boundary
waters. The negotiators established the principle of equality, but the history of boundary relations shows that it is difficult to effect in practice,
particularly with regard to domestic and sanitary use in the Great Lakes
or, in other words, water consumption and pollution.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See Boundary Waters Treaty. supra note 20.
Id. at art. 11.
Id. at arts. III & IV.
Id. at art. IV.
C. Bourne. International Law of Shared Fresh Waters 18 (unpublished manuscript).
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The anti-pollution provision of Article IV suffers from the same difficulty. The treaty is designed to deal with discrete issues in which the IJC
can issue an Order of Approval or one country can invoke principles to
prohibit an act or potential act in the other country that will have transboundary effects. The problem with issues like consumption and pollution
is that they arise from numerous acts, none of which may have any
significant transboundary impact, particularly in large water bodies like
the Great Lakes, though over time the total effects are large.
More positively, the principles offer shared values from which to approach the problems. Both sides agree that they should not pollute to the
detriment of the other. To some extent that focuses the issue on questions
of fact and permits a more functional, less political examination of the
issue. The UC is often asked to establish the facts, that is, whether the
problem exists and how serious it might be. However, as the long history
of LIC studies of Great Lakes pollution indicates, determining that a
problem exists is not enough. Apart from the principles, the most lasting
and still vibrant legacy of the Boundary Waters Treaty is the UC.
The InternationalJoint Commission
It is tempting to focus on the UC because of its visibility, its reputation
as perhaps the most active and successful international boundary water
institution, and a natural inclination among analysts to have institutions
correspond to the subject of investigation. The UC has an important role
in boundary water relations, but its role is limited. Many issues never
reach the UC or reach it only at the point in the history of the issue when
the governments feel the commission can contribute. For example, the
commission has not been involved in the acid rain dispute, and has had
only a secondary role in the pressing current issue of toxic chemical
discharges from waste dumps along the Niagara Frontier.
The six commissioners are appointed and serve at the pleasure of the
governments. They practice a "collegial" approach in the sense that they
come to collective decisions as individuals and not under instruction or
as representatives of their governments. Among international river commissions such an approach is unique to the IJC. The commission seldom
fails to reach a decision because of splits along national lines. Nevertheless, the commissioners will bring national points of view to bear with
varying degrees of force. These perceptions of national interest have to
be reconciled to arrive at a collective decision. Long delays in drafting
reports to the two governments reflect in part the problems of reconciling
perceptions of national interest with the collegial approach. Overall, the
character of the commission-for better or worse-reflects the personalities and capabilities of its commissioners, and the care of the respective
governments in selecting qualified and capable appointees. Many ap-
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pointees are known more for their political connections than for their
interest in or proven ability to deal with the. types of issues facing the
commission.
The main functions of the commission are to consider and approve
works, both in boundary waters and downstream on transboundary streams,
that affect the water level at the boundary and to conduct investigations,
or references, at the request of the two governments. The 1972 and 1978
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements greatly expanded responsibilities
of the commission. In fact, the commission has become so heavily involved in Great Lakes issues that there is a danger of it becoming
37 thought
of as a Great Lakes, rather than a boundary-wide, institution.
In line with popular and government concerns and current boundary
water issues, the commission has developed a decided environmental
orientation that contrasts with the largely engineering and legal outlook
of the early years. Some commissioners and environmental groups would
like the commission to evolve further into a role as the guardian of the
transboundary environment.
The priorities in the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty do not include some
of the important ones of today. Fisheries, recreation, and in fact the present
concern for environmental quality were omitted. The prohibition against
transboundary pollution was in advance of its time, but it gives the UC
no power and is inadequate to stop incremental pollution of boundary
waters. Despite the "recognized limitations of the treaty. it is regarded as
"untouchable" for it is thought that it would be virtually impossible to
negotiate as good a treaty today.3" The treaty has proven to be a "living
instrument," though somewhat arthritic in parts, capable of adapting to
changing conditions.
There has been some interest in reforming the UIC, interest shown more
by activist former commissioners like Maxwell Cohen. the interested
public, and academics than by the governments. There is a strong feeling
that -the commission could build upon its strengths to become a more
37. The 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement gives the UC during the life of the agreement
the duty to evaluate government programs for research and pollution control for which commitments
were made under the agreement. The agreement (art VIII) also created three institutions to assist
the commission: the Great Lakes Water Quality Board. to act as principal advisor to the commission:
the Great Lakes Science Advisory Board to provide advice on research to the commission and to
the Water Quality Board: and the Great Lakes Regional Office in Windsor to provide administrative
support and technical assistance to the two boards, and to provide a public information service for
the programs. including public hearings, undertaken by the UC and by the boards. For a discussion
of the responsibilities under the agreement and how they differ from regular IJC functions. see THE
ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA AND NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE CNITD STATES. THE GREAT
LMms WATER QUALITY AGREEMENT: AN EVOLVING INSTRUME..rT FOR ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT 78-

95 (1985) [hereinafter cited as STUDY].
38. Letter from M. Cohen, former chairman of the Canadian section of the UC. to the author
(1977).
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effective instrument for boundary environmental protection and management. The strength of the commission lies in a number of areas.
First. the commission performs valuable administrative and quasi-judicial tasks in handling a wide range of minor and major boundary level
issues. Of less importance now than formerly the commission's work is,
nonetheless, important in relieving the governments of issues not well
suited to normal bilateral negotiations. Second, this work and other tasks
performed in references and by its boards have given the commission
experience and legitimacy in dealing with boundary issues. and a reputation of impartiality. Third, the DC is an arbitrator of fact. In contentious
boundary references where neither side has full confidence in the other's
facts the commission has the reputation, through its board investigations,
of being able to determine and win acceptance of the facts of the issuethe critical first step in successful negotiation of technical issues. Fourth,
it is a mediator of policy. The commission in its reference investigations
has an international perspective, which considers boundary issues from
each country's position and from its own concern for solutions to problems
without regard for the boundary. Fifth, under the umbrella of IJC boards
most of the top water managers in both countries come together regularly.
This has created an informal network of contact among government officials and experts that facilitates understanding of each government's
positions, notice of impending actions that may have transboundary effects, and importantly in reference boards, lays the groundwork for subsequent international agreements following completion of the inquiry.
A wide range of reforms has been suggested. Some reforms seek to
improve the performance of the commission through better staffing; greater
formalization of the qualifications, terms, and duties of the commissioners: or more secure and satisfactory funding arrangements from the governments. Other types of reforms concentrate on increasing public
participation and public information programs. The UC's relations with
legislators and government departments are the subject of other suggested
reforms. The UC is seen as an institution that should have a mandate to
protect and manage the boundary environment. Many reforms suggest
expanding the commission's jurisdiction and authority in order that it
might more effectively carry out this role, for example, through power
to conduct its own investigations, establish standards, coordinate and
participate in government environmental and other water oriented studies
and programs, and license waste dischargers. The more ambitious of
these reforms anticipate the commission having limited supranational
authority.39
39. For a critical discussion of UC "reform mongering.' see Munton. Paradoxesand Prospects.
in THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION SEVENTY YEARS ON 60 (R. Spencer, J. Kirton. & K.
Nossal ed.. 1981).
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Many of these reforms reflect weaknesses experienced in the commission's operations. Others reflect the limitations of the commission's mandate and weaknesses, or perceived weaknesses, of the governments in
responding to problems along the boundary. Reform of the UC raises the
question of what role should the commission have and, given the political
pressures that exist in bilateral relations, what role will the governments
allow it to have?
Both governments have managed to keep their enthusiasm for reform
in check. In fact, they have rebuffed requests of the commission for a
modest expansion in its authority. In the early 1970s the work of the UC
grew greatly in a series of reference investigations and its duties increased,
particularly under the Grea: Lakes Water Quality Agreements. In this
atmosphere it seemed that the commission might increase its jurisdiction
significantly, and some commissioners actively advocated a more expansive role for the commission. In the mid- 1970s the commission wished
the governments to submit to it plans and information on actions that
might affect boundary water levels (in this case American plans for the
St. Mary's ice boom). In another instance the UC asked whether the
commission might be used in some way to ensure "notice and consultation" provisions between the governments. The governments were united
in their opposition to the commission's requests.'
It was in this period also that the Regional Office of the UC in Windsor,
established under the 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, came
under attack. The office was growing rapidly and had the potential to
undermine the UC boards as the principle source of information and
interpretation to the commission. In the 1978 Agreement the role of the
Regional Office was severely limited to serve as a secretariat to the boards
and to carry out public information programs of the commission for the
Great Lakes.
Munton recorded officials in the late 1970s as characterizing the relationship between the governments and the commission as one of "fundamental distrust. " The commission, or some members, were thought to
be "empire building." 4 ' As the commission's work expanded into ever
more complex and politically sensitive areas there was a questioning of
the legitimacy of the commission in complex environmental issues. "While
the IJC in boundary waters questions narrowly defined is accepted as
legitimate. its involvement in continental ecosystem questions broadly
defined is not." 4 2 Pursuing water quality through the ecosystem approach
will lead through many sensitive byways of domestic politics where the
40. See id. at 77-81.
41. Id. at 83.

42. Id. at 34.
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commission may not be welcomed or for which, as a non-representative
appointed body, it is not equipped.
Not only did the commission have its "wings clipped severely" for
trying to do too much in the 1970s, " ' but the governments have in recent
years been neglecting it. For six months in 1981 there was only one
commissioner, and it was not until the end of 1982 that the commission
was again at full strength. For a number of months in 1985 there was
only one Canadian commissioner. The governments have also been underutilizing the commission. Between 1977 and 1985 the governments did
not give the commission any new references.
The lack of references may in part reflect government and official
attiudes and a lapse in the traditional Canadian government's commitment
to maintaining a strong and effective commission. It also reflects changes
in bilateral boundary relations. Many of the issues that may have been
appropriate for UC references have faded from view. Energy developments--oil refineries, thermal power plants, coal and mineral exploitation-that were of concern to one or other government, have been set
aside with the recession and increased energy conservation. Moreover,
relations between Canada and the United States have been "hard nosed"
and less sympathetic to third party problem solving approaches.
While the suspicion of the late 1970s may have lessened today. it is
clear that the governments have a conservative view of the commission's
role. In the words of one American official, the IJC is a fine institution,
but its usefulness should not be exaggerated. The governments see it as
a tool useful in some circumstances, but not in others. They want to
employ it as they see fit, that is, when its use will be most appropriate
with regard to domestic issues and bilateral relations. They do not want
the commission to have authority that might allow it to interfere with
their sovereign rights to solve boundary problems to their best advantage.
CONCLUSIONS
The preconditions for cooperation are quite simple: the "political will"
to cooperate, encouraged by some sense of reciprocal interest. One might
add to this effective treaties, agreements, precedents, practices, and 'institutions that provide clear guidelines as to each country's responsibilities
and obligations; free communication among officials; and common problem solving mechanisms. While Canada and the United States enjoy more
of these features than most countries, for many issues the preconditions
are not in strong enough evidence to assure proper care for common water
resources.
43. 1d. at 80.

Spring 19861,

CANADA-UNITED

STATES BOUNDARY WATERS

Competition over the use of these waters has been a feature of relations
since the beginning of the century. Water shortages in the West. toxic
chemical pollution, acid rain, hydroelectic development, water withdrawals, and a host of other current and emerging issues will continue
to keep boundary waters on the bilateral agenda. It is time to think more
creatively to nourish the conditions that assist in boundary waters management.
Traditionally bilateral issues are treated separately with no linkage,
except the precedents applied from previous similar issues. Such an approach may be too restrictive. The basis for successful settlement of issues
is a reciprocal interest, and for many types of issues one side loses to
the benefit of the other. More imaginative thought might be given to
packaging issues to create possible outcomes in which both sides benefit.
Canadians have concerns about the St. Marys and Niagara Rivers over
the loss of what they feel is their entitlement to flow for use in hydroelectric generation. Such an issue might be tied to other apportionment
and flow issues of concern to the United States, such as American interest
in increasing hydroelectric production from flows as yet uncommitted to
power production. This approach is no panacea. The scope to create such
negotiating packages is limited. Nevertheless, there may be some advantage to returning to some of the perspectives on river basin development that led to the Columbia River and St. Lawrence Seaway
developments. Such a view takes a broad look at inter-jurisdictional
waters to identify uses, developments, and arrangements where both sides
would be better off from working together than by working alone,.
The UC has pinpointed a major strategic problem in dealing with water
quality in the Great Lakes. The governments have recognized the concept
of the ecosystem and the ecosystem approach to dealing with toxics and
other Great Lakes problems. However, the governments as yet do not
have an effective binational ecosystem strategy. The problem is how to
conceive and implement such a strategy in an international and otherwise
complex inter-jurisdictional setting. It requires a commitment to integrate
policy and direction. But what form should that integration take?
There is a persistent theme for reform suggesting that new institutional
entities be created. The thrust of suggested institutional reform is to
consolidate technical and management skills in an organization with the
authority and jurisdiction to effectively tackle the transboundary problems. This might be in the form of basin authorities, for example. a Great
Lakes authority, or an increase in the authority of the [IC. However, such
reform may not be practical or, on reflection, desirable.
As this article emphasizes, the jurisdictional pressures at work in boundary
relations do not easily admit such functional reform. We must-live with "
the expectation that governments will not cede authority or jurisdiction
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to binational organizations except in very limited circumstances. The
manner in which the governments have treated the IJC is an indication
of the fact that governments keep a tight rein on international organizations. Authority is given up only where the governments have few vital
interests at stake or when they can keep indirect control.
Functional organizations work best when they have been drained of
political content. That is, they work best when they deal with issues in
which major bilateral contentious political policies and orientations have
been resolved. In Canada-U.S. relations we have reached that state for
some issues but not others. The issuance of orders of approval on water
levels and flows by the JC is a good example of an issue area that the
governments can leave to an independent functional entity with little
concern. However, an issue area such as management of Great Lakes
water quality is still full of vigorous political life. There is agreement in
principle on equality, but how it is defined for each issue differs. No
international management authority could succeed until the major political
questions and principles for each issue have been resolved and the client
governments have anticipated the political ramifications of the organization's mandate.
There is room, however, to strengthen the LC and the useful investigative and fact finding role it has proven it can play in bilateral issues.
The governments in recent years have shown a shyness in using fully the
capabilities of the commission and its staff. The commission was given
no new investigative assignments from 1977 to 1985. 'in approaching
issues like Niagara River toxic pollution and acid rain-issues riddled
with the type of technical uncertainty the UC addresses well--the governments have turned away from the reference approach. If the governments have lacked confidence in the ability of the commission to handle
new challenging assignments, it is in their hands to help the commission
regain the confidence of government. In addition to providing sufficient
financial and personnel resources, the governments must pay particular
attention to appointing commissioners of appropriate experience and political sensitivity. Loss of confidence by the governments results from
appointment of commissioners more in tune with political and bureaucratic patronage than with the requirements of the job.
For many boundary water issues there is a natural transnational community of interests. Transnational association of like-minded interests can
work together to give a different perspective that might show the way to
new approaches for dealing with some boundary issues, and encourage
political acceptance of new policies. The present discussions and agreements among Ontario, Quebec, and the Great Lakes states offer political
approaches for building a regional consensus on Great Lakes issues that
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can have an impact on national approaches. Joint study programs between
Canadian and American universities can be fertile areas for new ideas.
Environmental and other interest groups will contribute their special views
on issues of concern to them. One might note the study undertaken by
the Royal Society of Canada and the National Academy of Sciences,
funded by the Canadian and American Donner Foundations, to review
the progress under the 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement." To
break out of the mold set by traditional government approaches to boundary water issues, these transnational initiatives should be encouraged.
Much can be done by political leaders personally at the bilateral level.
Political leaders can take bolder steps than lower level officials. Their
interest and commitment can energize the relevant government departments and the process of bilateral exchange. Interest and commitment do
not always solve the problems. For example, if Congress opposes an
initiative, presidential support may not be enough. At the least, heads of
state and ministerial level meetings put bilateral environmental issues on
the agenda at high levels; talks serve as educational functions. Positions
have to be elaborated and defended. While the Canadian government may
not be happy with the American government's policies regarding acid
rain, the fact that the Prime Minister raised the issue with the President
forced the President to acknowledge the Canadian concerns, to agree to
a study by special envoys, and at least to give some consideration to the
modest recommendations of the envoys.
Following a low ebb in Canada-United States relations, the apparent
good relations between President Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney
raise hope that common environmental problems will receive a better
hearing in Washington. The question is what commitment will the political
leadership give to boundary water issues in bilateral discussions?
In environmental issues there is generally a large element of scientific
and technical uncertainty. For example, in the toxic pollution issue there
is a widening gap between our ability to detect toxic substances and our
ability to interpret and give meaning to the findings. Many of the issues
concerning acid rain remain uncertain. When a government is on the
defensive, as the American government is on acid rain or Niagara toxics,
it will use that uncertainty to delay serious consideration of means to
resolve the issue by insisting on further research. Adopting such a position
is not necessarily obstructionist. The environmental damage from continuing with present actions or policies is often uncertain, while the costs
of remedial action are certain to be high. Governments have a responsibility to ensure that the abatement actions are worth the price.
44. See STUDY. supra note 37.
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In the face of some of the transboundary problems between Canada
and the United States there is a premium on good scientific information.
The generation of such information must be maintained and expanded to
identify emerging problems, to strip away uncertainty fogging appreciation of the environmental ramifications and political responsibilities, and
to point out feasible, cost effective remedial measures.

